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AGE-BASED RATIONING AND TECHNOLOGICAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

MAXWELLJ.MEHLMAN* 

I. INTRODUCTION 
In his book Setting Limits, Daniel Callahan asserts two main the­
ses. First, he urges that society reevaluate its position on aging and 
death so that the appropriate goal of medicine shifts from prolonging 
life to "helping people to live out a full and natural life span."l This 
author has no quarrel with Dr. Callahan's suggestion. Evidently dis­
trusting that the aged and their caregivers will embrace this goal volun­
tarily, Dr. Callahan proposes as his second major theme that his ap­
proach be imposed on them through limitations on public spending, 
chiefly under the Medicare program.2 "Medicare benefits," he states, 
"would be denied to some elderly people ...."3 In particular, he advo­
cates that benefits be denied to those persons who had lived a "natural 
life span," which Dr. Callahan refuses to specify in years beyond say­
ing that "it would normally be expected by the late 70s or early 80s."· 
Dr. Callahan recognizes that hinging his rationing program on the 
denial of Medicare benefits creates a problem of unfairness: not all eld­
erly persons would die for lack of life-extending treatment, but only 
those who could not afford to buy the treatments for themselves outside 
of the Medicare system.1i Life-extending care could be financed not 
• Associate Professor of Law; Director of Law-Medicine Center, Case Western 
Reserve University Law School. B.A. 1970, Reed College; B.A. 1972, Oxford Univer­
sity, Brasenose College; J.D. 1975, Yale University. The author thanks Harold Ranzi 
for his research assistance. 
I. D. CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 223 
(1987) [hereinafter SETTING LIMITS] . 
2. See id. at 115-58. Dr. Callahan does not explain why voluntary rationing-the 
process whereby the elderly simply renounce life-extending care-is insufficient to 
achieve his objectives of rationing medicine and restoring its social and fiscal responsi­
bility. Perhaps he is concerned that his ideas will never be accepted by enough people 
to achieve these goals. Alternatively, he may be concerned about the free rider prob­
lem, whereby those individuals who wished to live longer did so at the expense of those 
who did not. 
3. [d. at 198. 
4. ld. at 171. 
5. See id. at 156-57. "That such a priority system would invite some abuses and 
create some new problems should not be denied or minimized. A government policy of 
denying Medicare support for life-extending treatment beyond a certain age would 
favor those elderly who could afford personally to pay for such care." Id. 
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only out of personal resources, but also with family funds,s charitable 
contributions,7 and private insurance. This replaces the public wealth­
transfer system represented by Medicare with a system of private 
wealth transfers that favors: (I) those able to finance care themselves 
or purchase insurance; (2) those with supportive or guilt-ridden fami­
lies or friends of substantial financial means; and (3) those who are 
sufficiently attractive, well-connected, or well-marketed to provoke an 
adequate philanthropic response by the public. 
At first Dr. Callahan downplays the significance of this problem 
when he states: 
[A] rigorous effort to enforce egalitarian solutions is a good prescrip­
tion for an authoritarian society. The benefits of the unfairness (if 
such it is) of the system I propose would be limited to those beyond 
a certain age, and precisely because of that advanced age would for 
most be a limited benefit, to be terminated shortly by death. I do not 
believe a society would be made morally intolerable by that kind of 
imbalance.8 
Eventually, however, he begins to appreciate that unequal treat­
ment of the elderly on the basis of wealth could threaten his entire 
rationing scheme: "The negative symbolism of a society and a medicine 
that denied life-saving care to those too poor to pay for it need not be 
elaborated upon. It could be potentially troubling at the least, and 
scandalous if widespread.'" Indeed, society repeatedly has balked at 
rationing life-saving care on the basis of wealth.1o For example, con­
6. See id. at 157 ("A government policy of denying Medicare support for life­
extending treatment beyond a certain age .. . . could also severely tempt many middle­
class families to sacrifice their less-than-ample resources to save the life of a loved one 
they are not yet ready to relinquish.") . 
7. See id. at 198-99. Dr. Callahan's concern with charitable contributions raises 
the prospect of public 	as well as private appeals for assistance. He writes: 
To make life-extending care available only to those who could pay for it 
would not necessarily mean that only the rich or affluent would benefit. It 
could and no doubt would invite desperate efforts to raise the needed money 
among those of modest means; they could spend themselves into 
impoverishment. 
/d . 
8. [d. at 157. 
9. [d. at 199. 
10. Denying life-saving care on the basis of wealth is different than allowing 
wealthy patients to purchase a better quality of health care than poor patients. So long 
as health care resources are developed and sold at least in part in a market-like envi­
ronment, disparities of the latter sort will persist. Arguably, society merely has an obli­
gation to ensure that all of its members receive an adequate, but not an optimum or 
equal level of care. See I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. SECURING 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 4 (1983) ("[TJhe Commission proposes a standard of 'an 
adequate level of care,' which should be thought of as a floor below which no one ought 
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cern over the inability of poor patients with end-stage renal disease to 
obtain kidney dialysis in the late 1960s was a major reason for the 
initiation of the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease Program,tI which 
Dr. Callahan criticizes for its expense.12 More recently, the Oregon 
legislature reinstated Medicaid payment for certain organ transplants 
after a storm of protest. IS 
One alternative that Dr. Callahan considers to avoid this problem 
is to prohibit anyone from purchasing or delivering life-extending care 
for the elderly-"[t]o make such care explicitly unlawful."14 He pru­
dently rejects the idea, however, fearing the creation of a "lucrative 
black market," which would be impossible to police and which would 
encourage crime. Iii Not only would such a ban promote profiteering, 
but it would penalize those providers who felt duty-bound to deliver 
life-extending care regardless of the patient's ability to pay. In any 
event, there would be no practical way of preventing the rich from 
purchasing abroad the care that they desired, in much the same way 
that, in the past, abortions that were not available lawfully in the 
United States were obtainable in Mexico.ie 
Dr. Callahan seems to have a different solution in mind. The un­
derlying problem, as he sees it, is that we presently develop and employ 
to fall, not a ceiling above which no one may rise.") . As Dr. Callahan seems to recog­
nize, however, denying life-sustaining care for elderly patients who desire to live is 
likely to be regarded as a denial of adequate care, at least in some cases. 
II, National Health Insurance Proposals: Hearings Before the House Commit­
tee on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1524-46 (1971) (testimony of 
Mr. Shep Glazer, Vice President, National Association of Patients on Hemodialysis, 
concerning unaffordability of dialysis), 
12. See SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 144, Dr, Callahan states: "It has surely 
saved lives, but not for long, and the more than 80,000 users now cost well over $2 
billion a year." Id. 
13. See Lund, Oregon to Reinstate Transplants for Medicaid Patients, Am. 
Med, News, Apr. I, 1988, at 8, col. I. 
14, SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 199. This is one of three possible alterna­
tives offered to implement the idea of limiting life-extending health care for the elderly. 
See id. at 198-99. 
15. See id, at 199. Dr. Callahan writes: 

To make such care explicitly unlawful would pose another set of problems. 

Efforts to outlaw those goods or items which many people eagerly want, and 

often feel morally entitled to, are usually beset with enforcement problems 

and usually breed additional crime as an offshoot (think of the efforts to 

prohibit the use of alcohol in the 1920s, abortion through the I 960s, or, 

more recently, pornography and drugs) . A lucrative black market in the sav­

ing of life among the elderly is all too plausible a scenario under any out­

right prohibition scheme. 

16. L. LADER, ABORTION 57 (1966); see Dallis v. Aetna, 574 F. Supp. 547, 549 
(N.D, Ga. 1983) (dietary treatments for cancer obtainable in Bahamas); Note, Lae­
trile: Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Ineffective Drugs, 
127 U. PA. L. REV, 233, 234 (1978) (laetrile treatments obtainable in other countries). 
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medical technologies in a determined effort to extend the life of the 
extreme elderly, without regard to the quality of their lives or to the 
resulting drain on societal resources!7 Unless we solve this problem, we 
cannot expect to restrain health care expenditures for the elderly. IS 
Thus, he proposes that the government discourage the development or 
use of new technologies to extend life: "[N]o new technologies should 
be developed or applied to the old that are likely to produce only 
chronic illness and a short life, to increase the present burden of 
chronic illness, or to extend the lives of the elderly but offer no signifi­
cant improvement in their quality of life."19 The accomplishment of 
this goal would require "[f]orthright government declarations that 
Medicare reimbursement will not be available for technologies that do 
not achieve a high, very high, standard of efficacy."2o 
Formulated in this fashion, it is not clear whether Dr. Callahan's 
proposal, assuming it could be effectuated, would solve the problem of 
unfairness. His proposal rests on the assumption that we can discourage 
either the development of a technology or its use. Yet a reimbursement 
policy that merely discourages the use of life-extending technologies for 
Medicare beneficiaries permits those with sufficient funds to purchase 
the technologies outside of the Medicare system. Instead, a reimburse­
ment policy that prevents these technologies from being developed in 
the first place is needed.21 A non-existent technology would be unavail­
able to both the rich and the poor; no inequity problem would exist.22 
At times, Dr. Callahan seems to realize that, to avoid the unfair­
ness problem, he must discourage the development, and not simply the 
use, of undesirable technologies. At one point, for example, he advo­
cates a reimbursement approach that would "discourage development 
of marginally beneficial items. "23 Furthermore, he worries about 
17. 	 Dr. Callahan writes: 
[We need] an antidote to the major cause of a mistaken moral emphasis in 
the care of the elderly and a likely source of growing high costs of their care 
in the years ahead. That cause is constant innovation in high-technology 
medicine relentlessly applied to life-extending care of the elderly; it is a 
blessing that too often turns into a curse. 
SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 142. 
18. See id. ("Unless an antidote is effective, and can be found, no alternative to 
the present arrangement is likely to take hold."). 
19. [d. at 143. This is to counter the present "powerful bias in favor of innova­
tive medical technology, and a correspondingly insatiable appetite for more of it." [d. 
20. [d. Setting a high standard for reimbursement would be for the purpose of 
discouraging "marginally beneficial items." Jd. 
21. The same policy would have to be adopted by other technologically advanced 
countries so that the technologies could not be obtained elsewhere. 
22. There would also be no need to ration life-extending care in individual cases, 
which would greatly relieve the problems of those caregivers who found rationing im­
moral. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
23. SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 143. 
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preventing the development of technologies that would benefit the 
young as well as the old: "If technological development is discouraged, 
will that not damage the health interests of the young, even their 
chances to avoid a premature death?"2" At other times, however, he 
focuses only on the need to restrict the use of existing technologies.211 
Perhaps he intends the restrictions on use to be applied only to technol­
ogies that already exist when his rationing program goes into effect.26 
Alternatively, Dr. Callahan may anticipate that, once reimbursement 
limits cause manufacturers to lose money on existing technologies, the 
manufacturers will refrain from developing similar technologies in the 
future. 
Giving Dr. Callahan the benefit of the doubt, this Article assumes 
that he is proposing a reimbursement policy to prevent the development 
of undesirable, new technologies. The question is whether such an ap­
proach is feasible. 
II. 	 THE FEASIBILITY OF PREVENTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
UNDESIRABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
In determining the feasibility of this approach one must first ques­
tion whether Medicare reimbursement policy is capable of controlling 
the selective development of technologies. Medicare reimbursement ac­
counts for almost one-half of all hospital revenues;27 therefore, we 
might expect hospitals to refrain from acquiring technologies that were 
not reimburseable by the government. This would certainly affect the 
spread or diffusion of expensive, new technologies,28 but it is less clear 
24. [d. at 145; see infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. 
25. Dr. Callahan writes: 
The existence of medical technologies capable of extending the lives of 
the elderly who have lived out a natural life span creates no presumption 
whatever that the technologies must be used for that purpose . ... Medicine 
should in particular resist the tendency to provide to the aged the life-ex­
tending capabilities of technologies developed primarily to help younger peo­
ple avoid premature and untimely death. 
SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 173 (emphasis in original) . 
26. This is contradicted, however, by his position that pre-existing, life-extending 
technologies in widespread use should be grandfathered under his rationing scheme. 
Dr. Callahan writes: "[IJt would now be cruel to terminate federal kidney-dialysis sup­
port for the elderly . . .." [d. at 143. "A grandfather clause would also be needed in 
some circumstances: life-extending treatment such as insulin for diabetics or dialysis, if 
begun in early old age, should not be withdrawn in later old age." [d. at 183. 
27. See Health Statistics, Research, and Technology Assessment: Hearings on 
H.R. 5496 before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1984) (statement of Raymond 
Dross, M.D., on behalf of Health Insurance Association of America) . 
28. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 177 
(1985) ("Diffusion refers to the spread of innovation over time in a social system.") An 
example of the impact of Medicare reimbursement on the diffusion of new technologies 
675 
676 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:671 
that it would discourage their development. There is no evidence that 
manufacturers have curtailed the development of technologies because 
of current cost-containment efforts.29 For example, technologies may be 
developed by academics and health care professionals who may be less 
responsive than hospital administrators to cost-containment pressures. 
In particular, basic research is often conducted without future applica­
tions in mind, creating the prospect that new, life-extending technolo­
gies will be invented before reimbursement pressures can be felt. 30 
Even if reimbursement constraints subsequently reduce their com­
mercial attractiveness and therefore limit their widespread adoption by 
providers, objectionable technologies might survive long enough and at­
tract enough attention to become known to the medical community. 
Physicians then might have a duty in the course of obtaining their pa­
tients' informed consent to treatment to advise them that the new tech­
nologies exist.31 Those patients who could afford the technologies could 
then purchase them. This would create the same inequality problem 
previously mentioned, unless the technologies were also made available 
to patients under Medicare. 
Assuming that Medicare payment policy is able to constrain the 
development of new technologies, however, it would be necessary to 
identify which technologies are objectionable before the government 
could refuse to pay for them. 
is provided by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) devices. Medicare currently uses a 
prospective payment system, known as diagnosis-related groups, that pays hospitals a 
fixed amount for inpatient care based on the patient's diagnosis, generally without re­
gard to the nature of the care that is actually rendered. Since hospitals do not receive 
greater payment if they employ expensive, new technologies for their Medicare pa­
tients, they have a disincentive to use these technologies and therefore a disincentive to 
acquire them. However, this payment system does not yet cover outpatient care. As a 
result, the proportion of magnetic resonance imagers located in outpatient s.ettings was 
twice that of computerized tomography scanners when compared at an equivalent stage 
of development, prior to the adoption of the prospective payment system. See Stein­
berg, Sisk & Locke, X-Ray CT and Magnetic Resonance Imagers: Diffusion Patterns 
and Policy Issues, 313 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 859, 869 (1985) . 
29 . The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, which oversees the Medi­
care cost-containment program, has found that this program has had no impact on the 
availability of new technologies. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION. 
MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: RE­
PORT TO CONGRESS 20 (June 1988). 
30. For a general discussion of the development of new medical technologies, see 
Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of 
Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. 778, 840 (J 986). 
31. If a physician is aware that a technology exists that might benefit his patient, 
the doctrine of informed consent obliges him to notify the patient of its existence even 
if the technology is difficult or expensive to obtain. See Kapp, Legal and Ethicallmpli­
cations of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 L. MED. & 
HEALTH CARE 245, 251 (1984); Mehlman, supra note 30, at 861. 
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III . THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING OBJECTIONABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
Unless undesirable technologies are accurately identified, the ra­
tioning scheme would be under- or over-inclusive.32 If the program is 
under-inclusive, we would continue to pay for and develop technologies 
that should not be provided to the elderly. If the program is over-inclu­
sive, on the other hand, we would discourage the development of desir­
able technologies. 
To identify undesirable technologies, we first must decide what 
characteristics make a technology undesirable. Then we must find some 
method of detecting technologies with these characteristics in order to 
discourage their development. 
Dr. Callahan attempts to provide some guidance for the first task: 
"[NJo technology should be developed or applied to the elderly that 
does not promise great and inexpensive improvement in the quality of 
their lives, no matter how promising for life extension."33 In other 
words, he states, "[iJncremental gains, achieved at high cost, should be 
considered unacceptable."34 Furthermore, government policy should 
discriminate against "technologies that do not achieve a high, very 
high, standard of efficacy" to preclude the development of "marginally 
beneficial items."311 "Routine use" of "routine technologies" should also 
be discouraged "[uJnless they can promise a high efficacy."36 
The rules that Dr. Callahan proposes are confusing and problem­
atic. Even if the technologies would extend life substantially, they are 
not to be developed unless they promise great improvement in the qual­
ity of life for the elderly. Thus, the meaning and assessment of "quality 
of life" becomes very important in terms of specifying which technolo­
gies to discourage. Dr. Callahan recognizes that the term is vague,37 
saying that it entails the possession of "certain potentialities for per­
sonhood," which in turn encompasses, at a minimum, "the capacity to 
32. The task of identifying technologies for which Medicare will not pay is per­
formed as part of Medicare's coverage program. In 1987, the Health Care Financing 
Administration published a notice in the Federal Register describing the Medicare cov­
erage system and requesting public comments. See Health Care Financing Administra­
tion, Medicare Program; Procedures for Medical Services Coverage Decisions; Request 
for Comments, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,560 (1987) . 
33. SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 143 (Dr. Callahan also discusses undesir­
able characteristics of various technologies that would influence a government policy of 
discouragement). 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 145. Dr. Callahan does not give any examples of the routine technolo­
gies to which he refers. For further information regarding rationing the use of routine 
technologies for the elderly, see infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
37 . See SETTING LiMITS, supra note I, at 178 ("The term itself is not felicitous, 
lacking clear cultural roots and a precise, well-understood meaning."). 
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reason, to have emotions, and to enter into relationships with others."38 
In other words, technologies for the elderly are not to be developed 
unless they significantly increase the patient's capacity to employ 
higher brain functions, regardless of the degree to which they extend 
life. This creates a problem for elderly patients who already possess a 
high quality of life; under Dr. Callahan's proposals, life-extending tech­
nologies for these patients should not be developed because they cannot 
promise great improvement in the patients' quality of life. 
Dr. Callahan's solution to this problem-making an exception for 
these patients-is fatal to a technology-based rationing approach.39 
Assuming that quality of life has something to do with the capac­
ity for higher brain functioning, when does a technology improve this 
dimension sufficiently to merit development? The answer to this ques­
tion differs from person to person and from one period of a person's life 
to another. A healthy young person contemplating a tax increase to pay 
for more technology for the elderly might have a different view than an 
elderly patient. Medicare officials ultimately make these decisions 
guided by political expediency; but whose perspective is to govern the 
reim bursement decision ?"O 
Even if a particular technology would improve the quality of life 
significantly, Dr. Callahan's rule forbids its development unless the im­
provement is "inexpensive."H How are we to determine that a technol­
ogy is inexpensive? Should we compare the cost of the technology to 
the cost of similar technologies (e.g., the cost of magnetic resonance 
imagers compared to the cost of CT scanners), or to the opportunity 
cost in terms of alternate uses for the money (e.g., defense spending or 
housing)? Does Dr. Callahan mean that, unless the technology is inex­
pensive, it should not be developed no matter how much it promised to 
improve quality of life? Or should the cost of the technology be com­
pared to its benefit, so that even a relatively expensive technology 
should be developed if it improved the quality of life to a sufficient 
degree? And if we compare costs and benefits, how can we calculate 
the value of freedom from pain or increased mobility?'2 
38. Id. at 179-80. 
39. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
40. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Mehlman, supra note 30, at 
794-99. 
41. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
42. See Mehlman, supra note 30, at 826-32. Market theory suggests that the 
ultimate purchaser of a product should decide the value of its benefits; but is the ulti­
mate purchaser the patient or the Medicare program? If it is the former, how can 
patient values be employed retroactively to discourage technology development? In any 
event, patient choices will be less cost-conscious than Dr. Callahan might be wil .ling to 
accept in view of the insurance feature of Medicare benefits, which gives beneficiaries a 
reduced stake in the economic consequences of their choices. Their stake could be in­
creased by increasing their out-of-pocket expenditures, e.g., by increasing Medicare de­
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Problems such as these are further complicated by Dr. Callahan's 
intention to withhold reimbursement for technologies that do not 
achieve a high standard of efficacy. In the language of technology as­
sessment,48 the term "efficacy" means the likelihood that the applica­
tion of a technology will improve a patient's health status under ideal 
conditions." When we say that a technology is highly efficacious, how­
ever, we are comparing its efficaciousness to something else, such as to 
the risk that it entails for patients or to the relative efficacy of other 
technologies. Thus we might say that a technology that yields a large 
amount of patient benefit and that presents only a low probability of 
minor risk to patients is highly efficacious relative to its risks. Alterna­
tively, we might say that a technology is highly efficacious if it yields a 
larger amount of net patient benefit than other technologies. Unfortu­
nately, Dr. Callahan fails to tell us which meaning he has in mind; yet 
his reimbursement strategy leads us in different directions depending 
on which meaning we adopt. For example, we might discourage the 
development of a powerful new chemotherapy agent if we are primarily 
concerned that it produces too many serious adverse effects; but we 
would likely promote its development if our approach is based on 
whether or not it is superior to the alternatives.4Ii 
ductibles and coinsurance, but only at the price of making the system more regressive. 
43 . Technology assessment is the field which evaluates technologies to determine 
their relative costs and benefits. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIES 
FOR MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 201-02 (1982) (defining technology assess­
ment as "[a] comprehensive form of policy research that examines the technical, eco­
nomic, and social consequences of technological application."). 
44. See BANTA, BEHNEY & WILLEMS, TOWARD RATIONAL TECHNOLOGY IN 
MEDICINE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR HEALTH POLICY 98 (1981), where efficacy is defined 
as "[t]he probability of benefit to individuals in a defined population from medical 
technology applied for a given medical problem under ideal conditions of use." "Ideal 
conditions" refer to the conditions that exist in a controlled clinical experiment, in 
which the patient/subjects are carefully chosen and the technology is applied by spe­
cially trained personnel in a prescribed manner. Ideal conditions can be contrasted with 
the typical clinical conditions under which the technology is applied; while the perform­
ance of the technology under ideal conditions is called its "efficacy" or "efficacious­
ness," the term "effectiveness" is used to describe its performance under average 
conditions. 
45. It is not clear which approach to efficacy is taken under the present system 
for determining which technologies Medicare will pay for, known as its "coverage pol­
icy ." See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. The Food and Drug Administra­
tion (FDA) determines whether or not Ii drug or medical device is marketable in inter­
state commerce, inter alia, on the basis of whether or not it is "safe and effective" 
(which in turn is a prerequisite to its being covered under Medicare). The FDA gener­
ally takes the approach of comparing it to other technologies used to treat or to diag­
nose the same condition. Conversation with William Vodra, former Associate Chief 
Counsel for Drugs, Food and Drug Administration (Sept. 16, 1985). For a general 
description of the regulatory provisions governing the activities of the FDA, see Mehl­
man, supra note 30, at 787-88 n.44, 844-45. 
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The problems raised by Dr. Callahan's reimbursement decision­
making rules are reflected in his examples. His paradigm for the type 
of technology that should not be developed is kidney dialysis for 
chronic renal failure.· e He objects to the limited increase in lifespan 
that it makes possible,·7 to the quality of life that it produces!8 and to 
its cost.·9 Yet dialysis obviously yields a sufficient quality of life from 
the standpoint of most patients for whom it is prescribed, since they 
choose to be placed on dialysis and rarely discontinue treatment on 
their own initiative.llo Furthermore, it is arguably efficacious for many 
patients-especially those for whom a kidney transplant is not a viable 
alternative-since it prevents them from dying of kidney failure for an 
average of at least five years. III Moreover, unless we conclude that an 
extra year of life is worth less than twenty-five thousand dollars, the 
average annual cost to Medicare for a patient on dialysis,1I2 the technol­
46 . See SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 143 ("[D]ialysis represents precisely 
the kind of technology that should not be sought or developed in the future ."). 
47. ld. ("It does not greatly increase the life expectancy of its users . .. . ") . 
48 . ld. Increased lifespan for most users "is at the price of a doubtful or poor 
quality of life and an inability to achieve earlier levels of functioning." ld. 
49. 	 ld. at 143-44. Dr. Callahan notes: 
The appeal to Congress that in 1972 underwrote the costs of dialysis was 
that it would save lives and at a relatively modest cost (the estimate was for 
a maximum expenditure of $400 million) . It has surely saved lives, but not 
for long, and the more than 80,000 users now cost well over $2 billion a 
year. 
Id. 
50. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOL­
OGIES AND THE ELDERLY 249-50 (1987) [hereinafter LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLO­
GIES] ("[M]ost patients who accept chronic dialysis adjust successfully and are able to 
carryon their family and work roles."). This report cites a 1985 study revealing that 
only 8.5 % of patients age 65 to 74 and 12 % of patients over age 75 died as a result of 
withdrawl from dialysis. Another study notes that some of these patients withdrew 
from treatment because it had ceased to yield any health benefit or were withdrawn by 
surrogate decision makers. Id. at 262. 
5 \. See id. at 251 -52. The report stated: 
Unfortunately, while transplantation is an attractive solution in princi­
ple, there are many difficulties in its implementation, especially the severe 
shortage of appropriately matched donor kidneys. In addition, life-long im­
munosuppresive therapy, necessary to prevent rejection of the donor organ, 
has many deleterious effects. Because of these and other problems, kidney 
transplantation is not at present a realistic option for most ESRD [end-stage 
renal disease) patients. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
52. The $25,000 figure is derived by dividing the total expenditure for Medi­
care's End Stage Renal Disease Program (two billion dollars) by the number of dialysis 
patients (80,000), using Dr. Callahan's figures. See SETTING LIMITS, supra note J, at 
144. The actual cost of dialysis per patient may be different since the program also 
covers some of the costs of kidney transplants. See LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, 
supra note 50, at 258 (average annual Medicare cost per patient for dialysis in 1984 
was $21,051). Costs for dialysis under Medicare in 1984 were no different than costs in 
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ogy is not too expensive. 
In short, Dr. Callahan's conclusion that chronic dialysis is the 
type of technology that should not be developed is only correct if we 
share his arbitrary, personal opinions about what constitutes an effica­
cious and inexpensive technology and about what should be regarded as 
an acceptable quality of life. The same is true of the other technologies 
that he complains about: intravenous and implantable infusion adminis­
tration of antibiotics;G3 nasogastric and total parenteral nutrition feed­
ing;G4 and emerging technologies for mechanical ventilation.GII 
1974, when corrected for inflation. Id. Moreover, data from 1974 to 1979 show that, 
although costs per patient for Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program rose 
30.8 % between 1974 and 1979, national per capita health expenditures for the same 
period rose by 74.9% . Id. 
53 . In SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 144, Dr. Callahan states: 
Antibiotics that can, at relatively low cost, be taken orally or given by injec­
tion are at present joined by those which can be given intravenously, a more 
expensive procedure. Eventually they will also be joined by those which can 
be infused by an implantable pump, a far more expensive procedure still. 
Cf id. at 412 (delivery and monitoring systems such as implantable pumps may yield 
more precise blood levels of drugs, reducing toxicity, side effects and dosage errors); 
LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES. supra note SO, at 338 (intravenous antibiotics often 
needed in long term treatment of severe infections to achieve adequate blood levels of 
drug) . 
54. Compare SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 144 ("The provision of food and 
water can now go from the spoon and fork to the nasogastric tube, and then to the 
relatively new and very costly total parenteral nutrition ... , the last at a cost of 
$50,000 to $100,000 a year.") with LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note SO, at 
287 ("Tube and intranveous nutritional support and hydration are clearly effective in 
sustaining life for patients of all ages who are physically unable to swallow, digest, or 
absorb food and fluids taken by mouth and for patients who do not take in food or 
fluids for whatever reason .") and id. at 320 ("[T]he well-documented relationship be­
tween malnutrition and poor outcome suggests that critically ill and chronically ill eld­
erly patients might benefit from increased use of these treatments and that Federal 
[test] policies that discourage their use may ultimately increase the overall cost of med­
ical care for such patients."). 
55. 	 In SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 144-45, Dr. Callahan states: 
Mechanical ventilation, a mainstay in the care of many elderly dying suffer­
ing from pulmonary insufficiency, is no less an area of advancing technology, 
ever able to sustain more people by evermore-sophisticated means-high­
frequency ventilation (HFV), extracorporeal-membrane oxygenation 
(ECMO), and-still in the theoretical stage-peritoneal oxygenation and 
carbon dioxide removal, and an implantable artificial lung. 
In LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note SO, at 205, it is stated: 
Experience with this technology [mechanical ventilation] provides clear evi­
dence that, for ' a substantial and diagnostically diverse patient population, 
mechanical ventilation can effectively assist or replace normal spontaneous 
breathing. Its wide availability and usually safe application have enabled 
thousands of patients of all ages to survive life-threatening pulmonary, neu­
romuscular, and neurologic disorders, as well as high-risk surgical 
procedures. 
See also id. at 406 ("Developments important for long-term mechanical ventilation 
681 
682 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:671 
Thus far our consideration has been limited to a determination of 
which characteristics render a technology one that Dr. Callahan would 
want to discourage. Assuming arguendo that we agree on this, however, 
we still face the formidable task of determining which technologies pos­
sess those characteristics. 
First, we must decide whether we want to evaluate all new tech­
nologies for purposes of determining whether or not to discourage their 
development or only some technologies. Developers of proprietary tech­
nologies such as new drugs or medical devices would have an incentive 
to evaluate all new products to avoid expending research and develop­
ment money on technologies that eventually would be refused reim­
bursement. However, Medicare would still need some system for re­
viewing proprietary technologies that beneficiaries were furnished to 
determine if the technologi'~s were ones that Medicare should pay for. 
Furthermore, this would require that Medicare review the many new 
technologies that are not proprietary, in other words, that are not sold 
or licensed by their developers.1I6 This is particularly characteristic of a 
medical or surgical technology, such as a new technique for performing 
an operation, that does not entail the use of a new drug or medical 
device. 1I7 
Since many new technologies provided to Medicare beneficiaries 
would not run afoul of Dr. Callahan's prohibitions (assuming we un­
derstood what they were), evaluating all new technologies might be a 
waste of resources. To reduce the number of technologies requiring 
evaluation, however, Medicare would need some screening system to 
identify the more likely candidates.1I8 
The problem with constructing a screening system lies not only in 
deciding what technology characteristics to screen for, but in deciding 
when the screening should take place.1I9 Screening technology in its 
early stage of development makes it less likely that it will be accessible 
outside of Medicare and, therefore, reduces problems of inequity if 
include improved reliability, portability, ease of use, and comfort."). 
56. One could exclude these technologies from Dr. Callahan's rationing program 
to avoid having to identify them, but development of many of the most expensive tech­
nologies would then be undeterred. Surgical procedures alone account for approxi­
mately 30% of U.S. health expenditures. See Moore, Surgical Streams in the Flow of 
Health Care Financing: The Role of Surgery in National Expenditures: What Costs 
Are Controllable? 201 ANNALS OF SURGERY 132, 134 (1985) . 
57. See Mehlman, supra note 30, at 820-21. The developers of these technologies 
rarely restrict their spread, such as by patenting them. Instead, developers seem intent 
on encouraging their colleagues to adopt their new techniques, and to that end publi­
cize their success in the medical literature, at conventions, and in the workplace. 
58 . Evaluating all technologies would not be a waste of resources, however, if it 
were cheaper than developing and applying screening criteria . 
59. This problem besets whoever performs the screening, including the 
manufacturer. 
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Medicare does not pay for it.sO The younger the technology, however, 
the less will be known about it, including its future uses and its costs 
and benefits. Early screening therefore runs a greater risk of mistak­
enly discouraging potentially valuable technologies.s1 
Screening at an early stage of technological development creates a 
special difficulty for Dr. Callahan's rationing program. Since his objec­
tive is to discourage inappropriate technologies for the elderly, his pro­
gram must identify those technologies prescribed for this age group; 
otherwise, his plan prevents the development of technologies that, while 
inappropriate for the aged, would be suitable for younger populations.s2 
In their early stages, however, technologies are typically tested and in­
tended for use in younger populations. As Dr. Callahan himself recog­
nizes, "their use gradually spreads from the younger to the older pa­
tient."s3 As a result, it is unlikely that a technology at an early stage of 
development is identifiable as intended exclusively for use in 
Dr. Callahan's elderly population.s• 
Assuming that a suitable screen could be developed and that a 
time in the life of an emerging technology could be chosen for the 
screen to be applied, it would still be necessary to screen all new tech­
nologies prior to Medicare reimbursement. This would require some 
sort of "gate" through which all new technologies must pass. No such 
mechanism currently exists and it is unlikely that one could be created. 
The Food and Drug Administration operates the only such gate in the 
form of the licensing requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.slI This law, however, covers only new drugs and medical 
60. In addition, the older the technology, the more likely that potential patients 
and their providers will oppose the loss of the technology. 
61. See Mehlman, supra note 30, at 802-03, 821. As emphasized therein, many 
technologies are also constantly changing, and the results of screening at one point may 
not apply to a technology at a later stage. 
62. Actually, there is no way that his approach can avoid this. See infra notes 
85-93 and accompanying text. 
63 . SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 144. An example of this is percutaeous 
transluminal coronary angioplasty, a technique that widens the arteries to reduce the 
symptoms of cardiovascular disease such as angina. This procedure was originally per­
formed on five patients between the ages of thirty-eight and sixty-one. Gruntzig, Trans­
luminal Dilatation of Coronary-Artery Stenosis, THE LANCET 263 (1978). Eventually 
it was used in patients over sixty-five. See Mock, Holmes, Vlietstra, Gersh, Detre, Kel­
sey, Orszulak, Schaff, Pi ehler, Van Raden, Passamani, Kent & Gruentzig, Percutane­
ous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) in the Elderly Patient: Experience in 
the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute PTCA Registry, 53 AM. J. CARDIOL­
OGY 89C-91 C (Supp. 1984). Its use in patients eighty years of age and older is now 
being reported. See Kern, Deligonul, Galan, Zelman, Gabliani, Bell, Bodet, Naunheim 
& Vandormael, Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty in Octogenarians, 
61 AM. 1. CARDIOLOGY 457 (1988). 
64. For a discussion of the consequences, see infra notes 86-92 and accompany­
ing text. 
65. 21 U.S.c. § 331(a), (d) (1982); id. § 351(f); id. § 355 (1982 & Supp. IV 
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devices, and therefore, as noted earlier,66 would only restrict the devel­
opment of new medical and surgical technologies that employed new 
drugs or devices. Furthermore, these licensing requirements are im­
posed at a late stage of the development process.67 If licensing were 
restricted because the technology failed to meet Dr. Callahan's objec­
tives, there could be a significant waste of research and development 
resources and the restrictions might come so late that they might fail to 
discourage further development in the face of pressure from patients, 
their families, and providers.66 Finally, the Food and Drug Administra­
tion currently has no authority to refuse to license a product because of 
its COSt.69 Therefore, under current law, one of Dr. Callahan's chief 
objectives, discouraging expensive technologies, fails. Furthermore, it 
would likely prove extremely difficult to create a cost standard for the 
agency to apply.70 
The Medicare system itself operates a coverage system for deter­
mining whether or not it should pay for a technology that is provided to 
a beneficiary.71 The system does not screen new technologies routinely; 
rather, the system selects the technologies to be evaluated in a fairly 
haphazard fashion. 72 It therefore would not serve as an effective 
1986). 
66. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
67 . The development process often continues even after the product is licensed . 
For example, the manufacturer may develop new dosage forms or uses for a drug en­
tity. Furthermore, the FDA requires the manufacturer to continue to monitor the 
safety and effectiveness of its products once licensed. This can lead to changes in the 
product or in its marketing. 
68 . See Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Af­
fecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 252 (1976). Profes­
sor Blumstein calls this type of pressure "institutional blackmail." He is so concerned 
about its ability to make society spend more on health care resources than it should 
that he argues that rationing should be conducted by private entites rather than by the 
government. For a criticism of his position, see Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Life­
saving Medical Treatments, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 239, 274-78 . 
69. See Geweke & Weisbrod, Clinical Evaluation vs. Economic Evaluation: The 
Case of a New Drug, 20 MED. CARE 821 (1982). See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, COST­
BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE, 
AND POTENTIAL 198-99 (\ 982), for a discussion of FDA's authority to use economic 
criteria in evaluating drugs and devices. 
70. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
72. For a description of the Medicare coverage system, see Health Care Financ­
ing Administration, Medicare Program; Procedures for Medical Services Coverage De­
cisions; Request for Comments, 52 Fed . Reg. 15,560 (1987). As this publication 
reveals, technologies for evaluation are identified following inquires from beneficiaries, 
physicians and other providers, manufacturers, government officials, and the organiza­
tions that administer Medicare's decentralized claims process (carriers, fiscal in­
termediaries, and Peer Review Organizations). See id. at 15,561. Most coverage ques­
tions are resolved at a local or regional level, resulting in variations in coverage from 
one part of the country to another. Only national coverage determinations made by the 
/­
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gatekeeping mechanism for Dr. Callahan's purposes. 
The present coverage system could screen all new technologies if 
approval by the Health Care Finance Administration7S were required 
prior to reimbursement eligibility.7' Obtaining approval would be the 
provider's responsibility, since it would be reimbursed only for a cov­
ered item.7~ In the case of a proprietary technology, the provider could 
insist that the manufacturer obtain approval before the provider agreed 
to purchase the technology.76 
The major problem with this approach is its administrative cost. 
The slightest change in a previously approved technology could require 
a new screening process and possibly a complete new evaluation. This 
would entail a huge number of screening and evaluation procedures." 
central offices of the Health Care Financing Administration are generally published, 
and these are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. See I C.F.R. 
§ 305.87-8 (1988) (recommendation by Administrative Conference of the United 
States that national coverage determinations be subject to rulemaking procedures). 
73. This is the office within the Department of Health and Human Services that 
administers the Medicare program 
74. National Institutes of Health voluntarily established a similar system in an 
attempt to control research on recombinant DNA. See Department of Health and 
Human Services, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 49 
Fed. Reg. 46,266, 46,272-73 (1984). 
75. Medicare regulations currently permit a provider to charge the cost of non­
covered care to the patient if the patient had reason to know that the care was not 
covered at the time it was prescribed. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(b)-(c) (1982 & Supp. 
IY 1986) (Medicare waiver policy). Unless the charges were prohibited, providers 
could simply notify patients that Medicare had not approved a technology and thereby 
place the costs of the noncovered technology on the patient. This would also make 
patients aware of the existence of new technologies that they might wish to purchase 
outside the Medicare system. 
76. A similar shifting of risk occurs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, which allows a purchaser to avoid criminal liability for receipt of an unlawful 
product by obtaining a guarantee from the supplier that the product meets the require­
ments of the Act. See 21 U.S.c. § 333(c) (1982). 
77. The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") confronted this issue in at­
tempting to regulate new medical devices following enactment of the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 540 (1976) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.c.). The law contains provisions that allow the agency 
to waive formal, premarket approval for devices that are "substantially equivalent" to 
devices already on the market. See 21 U.S.c. §§ 36Oc(f)(\)(A)(ii), 360e (1982). The 
manufacturer must merely notify the agency of its intent to market the device and wait 
90 days. Marketing may begin at that time unless the FDA contacts the manufacturer 
and orders it to desist pending further review. This system has not operated smoothly. 
The responsibility is on the manufacturer to decide in the first instance whether or not 
its device is substantially equivalent to an existing device, and manufacturers routinely 
have taken the position that their devices were substantially equivalent in the hopes of 
avoiding the much more extensive and expensive full-scale approval process. As a re­
sult, the agency has been burdened with the job of deciding whether or not the device is 
in fact sufficiently similar to a pre-existing device. This has taxed agency resources 
severely and has slowed down the approval of devices that represent only trivial 
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The costs would remain high unless the proponents of the technology 
were denied a significant opportunity to participate in the screening 
and evaluation process and were denied the opportunity to obtain ad­
ministrative and judicial review of unfavorable decisions.78 Although 
review of administrative decisions under Medicare historically has been 
restricted,7s the need to obtain information on the new technology from 
its developers makes it essential that they be involved in the process,80 
while pressure from manufacturers, patient groups, and providers may 
make it impossible to limit their right to challenge the outcome.81 
Once the government decided which technologies to evaluate ac­
cording to Dr. Callahan's criteria, the government would have to con­
duct expensive full-scale evaluations.82 As in the case of screening, in­
formation costs could be reduced by relying on manufacturers for the 
data, but only in the case of proprietary products. Even then, the gov­
ernment would need to expend substantial resources to verify the data 
that would have been submitted. 
In the end, the number of technologies needing evaluation would 
changes from other products. In response, Congress is considering major changes in the 
process. See Rovner, Tougher Medical-Device Oversight Approved, 46 CONGo Q. 1735 
(1988). 
78. Computerized screens, which may reduce the costs, are increasingly used to 
assess the composition of health care resources and the quality of care. See, e.g., 2 
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 11 12,872.03 (1987) (generic quality screens to be 
used by Peer Review Organization). 
79. See, e.g., Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment 
Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 82-93, 100-03 
(1987); see also Mehlman, supra note 30, at 862-71 (discussion of limitations on pa­
tient challenges to Medicare coverage determinations). 
80. The FDA largely relies on the product manufacturer for information on 
safety and efficacy. Cf 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (Supp. IV 1986) (requiring submission of 
data). 
81. Manufacturers would be concerned not only about the effect of a denial of 
coverage following a negative evaluation but also about the impact on a product of 
being selected for evaluation following screening. See Blumenthal, Federal Policy To­
ward Health Care Technology: The Case of the National Center, 61 MILBANK MEMO­
RIAL FUND Q./HEALTH & SOC'y 584,601 (1983) (describing opposition from medical 
device manufacturers to establishing a list of priority health care technologies for fed­
eral assessment on the ground that it would slow the development of the technology at 
an early stage); see also Kinney, supra note 79, at 88 ("Questions have been raised 
among beneficiary groups and medical equipment manufacturers about the fairness of 
HHS procedures for making national coverage determinations and, particularly, the 
opportunities for public input in these determinations .") . 
82. The evaluations would be expensive because of the necessity to obtain and 
review information about the technology. A budget of $200 to $300 million a year has 
been suggested for a federal health care technology assessment effort. See Reiman, 
Assessment of Medical Practices: A Simple Proposal, 303 NEW ENG . J. MED. 153, 
153-54 (1980) . This would be in addition to the approximate $450 million budget for 
the Food and Drug Administration. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1989 (1988) . 
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be enormous and the cost of obtaining data about them overwhelming. 
This is underscored by Dr. Callahan's recognition that he is not simply 
talking about targeting a few major, highly visible diagnostic and treat­
ment modalities, such as artificial organs or magnetic resonance 
imagers. As he points out, "the larger problem lies not such much in 
what have been called the 'big ticket' items as in the high costs of 
much more routine diagnostic and therapeutic procedures."83 The cost 
of implementing Dr. Callahan's technology program for routine as well 
as exceptional technologies might be so large, in fact, that it might 
seem wiser simply to devote the funds to providing technologies to the 
elderly, or to encouraging research aimed at developing more cost-ef­
fective alternatives. 
IV . THE INABILITY TO MITIGATE UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS OF AGE­

BASED RATIONING 

Thus far the discussion has been limited to the practical problems 
with designing and implementing a rationing program to discourage the 
development of technologies for the elderly once they reached a certain 
age. More fundamental problems arise, however, with Dr. Callahan's 
efforts to mitigate the undesirable effects of his age-based rationing 
approach. 
Creating a non-discriminatory age-based rationing system necessa­
rily requires that certain life-saving technologies not be developed. Yet 
unless these technologies were prescribed exclusively for patients be­
yond the cutoff age, preventing their development also deprives those 
below the cutoff age of potential benefits. 
Dr. Callahan recognizes the problem, describing it as a "hazard" 
of his position.8ol He proposes a solution: "a technology assessment that 
examined whether, if [the technology] were developed for the young, 
its primary or disproportionate use might be among the elderly, and 
whether alternative means could be found to meet the needs of the 
83. SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 145; see Moloney & Rogers, Medical 
Technology-A Different View of the Contentious Debate Over Costs, 301 NEW ENG. 
J. Mw. 1413 (1979) (blaming low unit-cost technologies such as laboratory tests for 
high health care costs). Perhaps glimpsing the impossibility of discouraging the devel­
opment of technologies that are already routinely employed, Dr. Callahan confines his 
efforts to preventing their use. Dr. Callahan writes: "Unless they can promise a high 
efficacy also, their routine employment should be discouarged." SETTING LIMITS, supra 
note I, at 145 (emphasis added) . 
84. 	 SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 145. Dr. Callahan writes: 
An obvious dilemma here is that most technologies will benefit the young as 
well [as the old] and are developed with them often primarily in mind. If 
technological development is discouraged, will that not damage the health 
interests of the young, even their chances to avoid a premature death? That 
is a hazard .. . . 
/d. 
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young."8G 
It is not clear what Dr. Callahan means by such a technology as­
sessment or what he would do with its results.86 Assuming we could 
anticipate the eventual uses of a technology before its deveiopment,87 at 
what point would use for the elderly be "disproportionate" or "pri­
mary"? For example, Dr. Callahan states that the elderly will be the 
"primary candidates" for the use of several existing technologies, in­
cluding mechanical ventilation and artificial resuscitation (or CPR, for 
"cardiopulmonary resuscitation").88 Yet data shows that only twenty­
three percent of patients receiving CPR are over age eighty-roughly 
at Dr. Callahan's age cutoff89-and only approximately one-third of 
the patients dependent on mechanical ventilators are over age sev­
enty.90 Even if we agree that this shows that these technologies are 
likely to be used primarily by the extreme elderly, so long as not to be 
used exclusively by them, the prevention of technological development 
would deprive eligible, younger patients of their benefits.91 If somehow 
we could have prevented the development of CPR, seventy-seven per­
cent of individuals receiving CPR, who are deemed worthy to receive 
treatment under Dr. Callahan's approach, would have died for lack of 
the technology. 92 
85 . Id. 
86 . Id. Dr. Callahan concedes that he "Ieave[s] these as difficult problems for 
the trajectory [he is] proposing." Id. 
87. As discussed earlier, this is virtually impossible to do. See supra notes 60-61 
and accompanying text. In fact, it is not even easy to determine whether or not an 
existing technology is used primarily in the elderly since data on technology utilization 
are scant. See. e.g., LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 50, at 175 ("For sev­
eral reasons, accurate information on the utilization of CPR [cardiopulmonary resusci­
tation] is difficult to obtain."). 
88. SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 144. 
89 . See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
90. See LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 50, at 176-77 (CPR data 
from Boston hospital showing even higher percentage of use by elderly than most stud­
ies show). Dr. Callahan also mentions antibiotics and artificial nutrition and hydration 
as additional technologies that are primarily for the elderly, but the only utilization 
data available are for patients ages sixty-five and older, which includes a large number 
of persons who would be eligible to receive the technology even under Dr. Callahan's 
scheme. See id. at 293-95 (data on utilization of antibiotics). 
91. See SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 145. Dr. Callahan suggests that alter­
native means might be found to provide these benefits to younger patients. The young 
would still be deprived of some benefit unless the net benefits from the alternative were 
substantially the same as the net benefits from the technology for the elderly. If this 
were the case, however, it is likely that the alternative technology would be so readily 
adaptable for use by the elderly that it could be said to exist for purposes of being 
purchased by elderly patients who could afford it. 
92. The 77 % figure is the remainder of the estimated patient population once the 
23 % of patients over 80 are subtracted . See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text. 
Even if utilization by those over age 80 were greater, some younger patients would be 
disadvantaged if the technology did not exist. 
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On the other hand, if a technology that met his criteria for being 
discouraged were not likely primarily to be used by the elderly, 
Dr. Callahan seems to be saying that we should allow it to be devel­
oped, but that Medicare should not pay for its use in those patients 
beyond the cutoff age. Since the technology would exist, however, it 
could be purchased by wealthy patients, giving rise to the inequity 
problem. This is likely to be a common phenomenon under his ap­
proach, since, as noted earlier, he describes many of the technologies 
that he is concerned about as "routine."93 
Dr. Callahan's scheme is plagued not only by the prospect of inad­
vertently denying medical technologies to the young, but also by what 
to do about the exceptional elderly patient. On the one hand, he sug­
gests in several places that the denial of benefits ought to be categorical 
once a certain age is reached.94 Elsewhere, however, he urges that an 
exception be made for the "physically vigorous elderly person," appar­
ently regardless of chronological age: "It is the one category in which 
an exception to the cessation of Medicare-supported life-extending 
treatment to those who have lived a full life span would be justified."911 
Permitting exceptions for the vigorous elderly destroys 
Dr. Callahan's scheme. It replaces an irrebuttable presumption based 
on age with a rebuttable presumption based on a combination of age 
and quality of life.98 Before treatment were denied to a patient who 
desires it, Medicare would have to reject the patient's own assessment 
of the quality of his life. This would entail vastly more subjective judg­
ments by Medicare than an age-based criterion and would be enor­
mously expensive to administer. Due process considerations alone sug­
gest that any patient facing a denial of life-sustaining care by Medicare 
93 . SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 145; see supra note 83 and accompanying 
text. 
94. See, e.g., SETTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 138 ("Beyond the point of a 
natural life span, government should provide only the means necessary for the relief of 
suffering, not life-extending technology."); id. at 172 ("Provision of medical care for 
those who have lived out a natural life span will be limited to the relief of suffering." 
(emphasis in original)). 
95 . [d. at 184. Ultimately, he seems to be unable to decide which approach to 
take: 
By limiting life-extending care to everyone, would we not indiscriminately 
sweep up many in otherwise fine shape who, with one or two timely medical 
interventions, might have remaining a number of years of good life? The 
answer is that we would indeed, in a sense, penalize the latter group; or 
more precisely, we would not benefit them, despite the fact that they would 
gain much more from life-extending treatment than those in poor condition. 
But I see no way to avoid, at some point, a choice that will cause anguish, 
shorten some lives, and possibly appear unjust. 
[d. at 155. 
96. For a discussion of the constitutionality of employing an irrebuttable pre­
sumption to ration life-saving resources, see Mehlman, supra note 68, at 260-62 n.IIO. 
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on grounds of poor quality of life must be given such expensive proce­
dural rights as notice, an opportunity for a hearing, and the right to 
administrative and judicial review.97 
More importantly, however, a system that denied technologies to 
certain elderly patients but not to others could not aim to prevent the 
technologies from being developed in the first place, since this would 
deprive all patients of their benefits. Instead, it would attempt to con­
trol costs by denying reimbursement for existing technologies. In fact, 
to be sure that the benefits of the technology would be enjoyed by eligi­
ble patients it would hope that its reimbursement restrictions would not 
be so severe that they discourage the development of technologies.98 
V. CONCLUSION 
In attempting to create an age-based rationing system, in short, 
Dr. Callahan faces a dilemma-either he can choose to let patients die 
before their natural lifespan by preventing life-saving technological de­
velopment, or he can allow technological development, in which case 
the wealthy can purchase the technology and the inequity problem 
arises. 
Dr. Callahan perhaps could avoid this dilemma by attacking tech­
nologies that did not provide enough net benefit to any patients, regard­
less of their age or of the quality of their lives. In fact, he seems to 
adopt such a position in his discussion of dialysis." Under this ap­
proach, we could discourage the development of these technologies 
without being concerned about depriving eligible patients of their bene­
fits . Without the technologies, no problem of unfairness to the poor and 
to the middle class arises. 
This suggestion is hardly new, however. It resembles Lewis 
Thomas' objections to "half-way" technologies-technologies that 
neither cure nor prevent disease, but merely "make up for it" or post­
pone disease-related death. loo It runs into many of the practical diffi­
culties with discouraging technological development described ear­
97. See Mehlman, supra note 68, at 277 n.I77. 
98. In other words, the age-based reimbursement restrictions would have to be 
set at such a cutoff that the demand from eligible patients would sufficiently trigger 
technological development. 
99 . See SElTING LIMITS, supra note I, at 143 ("[Dialysisl does not greatly in­
crease the life expectancy of its users ... , and for most, that gain is at the price of a 
doubtful or poor quality of life and an inability to achieve earlier levels of 
functioning. "). 
100. See L. THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 31­
36 (1974). For a critical reaction to targeting technologies for scrutiny on the basis of 
whether or not they are "half-way," see Smits, The Clinical Context of Technology 
Assessment, 91. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 31, 33-34 (1984). 
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lier.101 Most importantly for Dr. Callahan's purposes, finally, it has 
nothing to do with setting health care limits based on age. 
101. See supra notes 19-2 1 a nd accompanying text. 
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